The following is the fill-in detail to the Kazakhstan coup attempt. Through this, you can understand the preparation that goes into all the color coups over the last 25 years including Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan. The preparation will be the same. Now it’s recognizable.
The same planners worked most of these events. The same managers ran the coups, successful or not, through Maidan. The same street-level managers worked most of these events including Kazakhstan.
The prep work for Ukraine began with surveys in 2011. The initiating factor was twofold. The first was Yanukovych repealing Stepan Bandera’s newly designate Hero status, which angered the Diaspora.
The second big factor which can be seen showcased at the beginning of Maidan, during Maidan, and at the end of Maidan was the Diaspora’s anger over the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko. The Ukrainian-American Diaspora addressed Yanukovych as the “OUN-b” when they demanded her release.
What differentiates Ukraine and Kazakhstan is SCL’s involvement in Maidan from beginning to end and the following years after the coup.
Let’s skip the introductory paragraph describing Kazakhstan’s wealth because you’ve probably read about or seen footage describing this country’s import. Instead, jumping straight into the Information Operation (IO) fueled failed January 2022 coup attempt, the people who did it had some success during their five other coup attempts over the last 10 years.
These people won’t just be exposed, this article will highlight their preparation for Kazakhstan through the reports and studies they generated during the years preparing for January 2022.
These are the core groups that did the prep work for the January coup attempt. All three tie to George Soros’s color revolution funding and the boots on the ground during preparation and the coup itself cut their revolutionary teeth on projects with SCL (Strategic Communications Labs) and IOTA Global before and during the 2014 Ukrainian coup.
This image is a real report title from the Kazakhstan effort.
Seven years ago, IO (Information Operations) was still outside most people’s lexicon when they described politics, elections, and political change. Unfortunately, with the 2014 Ukrainian coup through the 2016-20 US general election and subsequent impeachments, Belarus 2020, and now Kazakhstan; people around the world are being victimized by this particular brand of warfare.
It is warfare and until it’s treated as such, elected governments will be overthrown at the whim of an unelected Diaspora such as Ukraine, a criminal wishing to capitalize on national resources (Kazakhstan), NGOs, agencies, and legislatures using one coup to get another started (in this case it was Siberia).
There is a lot of misinformation circulating by reputable people about how IO works. It is not a software program.
It is psychological programming. Your mind is the software. You get programmed.
The purpose of “Influence Operations”(IO) is not to provide a perspective, opinion, or layout of a policy. It is defined as the ability to make audiences “think and act” in a manner favorable to the mission objectives. This is done by applying perception management techniques that target the audience’s emotions, motives, and reasoning.- Joel Harding
IO catalyzes core emotional responses that fuel your sense of loss, hate, love, fear, desire, and rage.
Finding the responsible parties outside Kazakhstan orchestrating the coup attempt was fairly easy. It took a little more time to map the route they took from the initial survey stages, onto planning, and finally how they got to the event itself.
While it’s easy and might be fun to engineer Agency participation (CIA, SIS, or other) for political purposes, it is counterintuitive for the following reasons.
Kazakhstan is a NEUTRAL state monitored by the three big players in the world.
The risk of any country getting caught sponsoring or carrying out an attack on the government of Kazakhstan is too high to justify the adventure when there is a pool of way too many willing actors jumping at the bit just to belly up to that table.
The various preparation reports cover page shows who funded the front-end information-gathering effort.
- Research Center for Religious Studies Kyrgyzstan is George Soros Funded.
- Internews is George Soros, US State Department, USAID, NED, and so on. Everywhere there’s a color revolution, Internews will be there supporting it.
- European Union
The street-level coup attempt was managed without professional-level IO management.
According to the forecast of the influential politician, despite the decisive actions of the CSTO to normalize the situation in Kazakhstan, after the popular unrest that has not yet been suppressed, it is possible that “serious players will be involved in the events”. In Kazakhstan, despite the seemingly already begun creation of a “strong barrier at the borders”, “new adventurers and masters of organizing mass unrest” will methodically infiltrate. Among them will undoubtedly be citizens of other post-Soviet republics who are eager to “realize their own relevant experience” and confirm their own reputation as “practitioners” in this kind of “work”.
The Open Dialogue Foundation (ODF) is an Ablyazov and Soros-funded color revolution breeding farm. They get support from stakeholder Diaspora groups, the US State Department, the US Congress, and the EU Parliament.
Muktar Ablyazov is Kazakhstan’s former Energy Minister, former chairman of Bank Turan Alem (BTA Bank), and is a co-founder and leader of the unregistered political party Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (QDT). Ablyazov is best known for embezzling $6 billion and getting asylum in France.
The QDT was the group trying to come into power through the January coup.
Their work entails making local contacts, developing influencer leaders for social-media-centered actions, and organizing tactical action during the riot and or color coup. The keyword for this group is TACTICAL.
ODF are not the stakeholders and should not be confused with them. Think of them as the stakeholder’s field representatives in the regime change game, or, more poetically, as the crack-whores of color revolution. They manage the stables of streetwalking rioters staffing the violence and chaos.
Groups like ODF survive by being beholden to whichever stakeholder will pay them for whatever regime change or IO project is in the works.
As you can see, part of the strategy document below, point 4, makes it clear that practitioners need to be reminded of the work they did WAS/IS on behalf of real stakeholders who are the clients of the IO going into play.
Because ODF has had a footprint in SCL color revolutions over the past decades, I’ve highlighted their projects below going back 2 years, 6 years, 8 years, 15 years, and 25 years.
This shows the progression of particular groups of actors with a narrow set of skills in the destabilization and overthrow of countries across CEE (Central & Eastern Europe) and Asia.
Kazakhstan provides a very long porous border to supply a Maidan in Siberia that only has a chance to succeed if Kazakhstan is involved.
Kazakhstan is a self-declared neutral country between 3 major powers, Russia, China, and the US. Because of its import, Kazakhstan has more private-sector intelligence, IO, Infowar, hackers, OSINT, etc., + some boots on the ground than East Berlin had James Bond types at the height of the Cold War. It’s a private Intel spy swamp.
Let’s tackle why it failed. The initial work was done professionally and to succeed the stakeholders and street teams should have been done working with an IO company or at least dropped the project into the lap of information ops professionals. After the hard part with all the preparation was done, the ball was dropped. So the reason for failure is pretty simple.
The companies capable of doing this work successfully at this level are very few, to begin with. When SCL wound down, its methodologies didn’t follow the company’s breakup and sale. Instead, that aspect was kept by departing owner Nigel Oakes.
When Kazakhstan was ripe, which was quite sudden, there was no one there capable of driving the media spectacle needed to succeed even with the tools provided.
The so-called opposition party leader, Ablyazov, cheated himself out of victory by using cheap-seat help that had a part in a few SCL color revolution/ coup campaigns including Ukraine.
My exposure to the SCL (type) methodologies used in Ukraine and the US proves a simple truism. Preparation is everything.
Without setting anthropological, sociological, and psychological bars your messaging has to meet inside your live TA (Target Audience), your best messaging efforts are a waste of time. It’s hit and miss that leaves you without a way to measure effectiveness. In short, you have a failed IO or coup program to the degree you miss the mark.
As you’ll see below, this is the part the actors didn’t understand in the Kazakhstan coup. It’s why I break the project into two separate phases by two different groups.
Even though the active group worked at the street level (their expertise is here), they failed to partner with the more important strategic planning and international media elements even though they partner and work through over 300 different outlets. They were not remotely prepared to pull the trigger.
There was no coordinated media strategy for the failed Kazakhstan effort. There was no unified western chorus. It took half the coup attempt to try to build a story against Nazarbayev. Most of the stories began with- Nazarbayev building the most stable former Soviet Asian country, blah blah, and was an example to the world and especially emerging democracies, blah blah. That poses a problem with the strongman narrative. Look back at early to middle media coverage.
This creates a friendly fire situation all through mainstream media known as information fratricide. The second group who staffed and managed the coup attempt only understood general swathes of IO strategy from a tactical level exposure. Most of this came at the successful professionally managed 2013-14 Ukrainian Maidan.
It was their limited experience at Maidan and lessons they thought they learned in Belarus that gave them the confidence to go ahead without the chops to back it up.
People like Mustafa Naayem (working with ODF) who was SCL’s spark that lit Ukraine’s Maidan had too great of a sense of himself and his importance. Neither he nor they understood the necessity of an across media PR effort and foreign group involvement needed in the start-up phase or the value and necessity of leveraging the TAA other than as software products showing them where to tweet to.
Nazarbayev the strongman! Nazarbayev can’t be a really bad guy if he’s building a cowboy democracy. Nazarbayev retired in 2019 and Kazakhstan has a new president. Nazarbayev and his family are dictators. Nazarbayev and his family lifted Kazakhstan out of the post-Soviet dust and made the country prosper.
Over half the articles on the coup dive into the schizophrenic pool of the last paragraph. Hence, the fratricide designation. He can’t be both so the reader relegates both sides null, or meaningless which negates foreign support of a People’s movement color revolution. No one will support what they can’t understand.
The IO in play was built on an Adhoc basis. The Target Audience Analysis (TAA) was done professionally. You can see the snippets of the actual TAA used in Kazakhstan in the screenshot images.
Below you’ll find the social media and street-level organizers and managers for the Kazakhstan coup attempt.
Included is everything from the IP at the main office the Kazakhstan coup attempt was cobbled together in, as well as the addresses of the satellite offices doing the technical work. You’ll find photos of the managers for the technical planning and execution.
The interesting way these plots play out.
The trajectory the professional IO coup planners took in 2017 looks noble enough at first blush. They were going to locate the demographic that were extremist, capable of swaying normal populations to extremism or were likely to be swayed by extremist zealots. This was supposed to curb terrorism in the below-mentioned countries by curbing ISIS/IGIL recruitment efforts through social media and media.
The result was only .54% of religious social media posts (within the demographic of 14-30-year-old ultra-religious males considered) contained what the project labeled dangerous content. They had to have a feel for this early on by the general scarcity of radical or violent messaging.
What it did instead gave them access to all the demographic groups and information they needed to sway normal people into the coup attempt. Understanding the following gave them the insight needed to be able to recruit these same people into the overthrow of their respective countries.
And lastly, it showed them which media and social media vehicles to use if they were going to be successful.
The initial project took a couple of years in the research phase. Because the project sounded like a winner for Kazakhstan and the other countries listed below, the IO planners got the countries themselves to contribute to the cost of the survey and demographic work. The government of Kazakhstan paid $26000 per annum to fund the early workload involved in the 2022 coup planning stages. This included the initial survey work and overall media/social media assessment.
Planners learned where they could find, develop, and nurture a base to provoke street violence.
As you can see below, it’s not a black art but a very developed science, and the reports drill down to a town and city basis as well as which television and radio programs reach what part of their TA. This also gave them insight into what strategic messaging would work and what will not. It also showed where to publish and when (day +time).
They knew if you want to reach radicals in Kazakhstan, try Instagram or Youtube first to reach them.
Radicalism Online: An Analysis of the Meanings, Ideas, and Values of Violent Extremism in Central Asia
To help prevent violent extremism in Central Asia, the Research Centre for Religious Studies of Kyrgyzstan analyzed values, narratives, and online messages created and distributed by banned extremist groups in five countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
The study included over 1.6 million messages containing religious rhetoric and provides insight into the meanings of the messages and the channels for dissemination, as well as the impact of the messages on the target audience. This was followed by a field study of 4,005 respondents in the 18-35 age range. In addition, the survey also sought to identify the media preferences of young people in the region. (Excluding Turkmenistan which was not included in the field study due to the travel restrictions imposed by the state during the COVID-19 pandemic.)
Using the findings, the Centre developed communication strategies for each country that recommended how media, NGOs, state authorities, and religious leaders could, with a focus on young people, contribute to promoting peace.
Although less than 1% of the analyzed messages containing religious rhetoric had what would be considered dangerous content, those particular messages often resonated with users’ values and interests, especially young people.
The messages promoting violence used specific, complex terms that were geared to people who were already followers of radical ideas rather than the average user. The intent of the messages was to deepen the commitment of followers rather than recruit new followers.
Administrators of violent extremist channels have developed multi-channel access strategies for potential recipients (through various platforms, chat rooms, personal messages, and reposts), thwarting the blocking measures used by Central Asian governments.
The messaging by extremist groups promotes purity of faith, mutual support to fellow believers, fighting against infidels and apostates, rejection of secular power and its decisions, ambition to create a caliphate, and anti-Semitism.
The main target audience of distributors of extremist content is young people aged 18-30 who are dissatisfied with the current political environment and who share a strong sense of injustice. Those aged 18-21 show the strongest support for the influence of religion on politics. Level of education is also a risk factor: young people with less education tend to engage more with the content.
According to the findings of automated content analysis, Lisa, the popularity of internet platforms with religious extreme content (not necessarily calling for violence) and hate speech varies by country.
In Tajikistan, Facebook (56 percent) and Odnoklassniki (37 percent) are the most popular social networks; in Kazakhstan, “Vkontakte” (74 percent) and Facebook (20 percent) are the most popular; in Kyrgyzstan, Facebook (48 percent) and Odno-class students” (28 percent); in Uzbekistan, Facebook (55 percent) and Odno-class students” (37 percent); and in Turkmenistan, Vkontakte (37 percent), “Classmates” (28%) and Facebook (25%)15. This does not mean that recipients visit only one channel. visits to more dynamic and depend on the most simplified and complete valuable access.
Field research has shown that such social networks like Instagram and YouTube are more commonly used in Ka– Zakhstan(Instagram – 83%, YouTube – 48%), Tajikistan (Instagram – 18%, YouTube – 27%), and Kyrgyzstan (Instagram – 38%, YouTube – 21%). YouTube is also the second popularity of a social network in Uzbekistan (36%), however the most popular network there is Telegram – 95% (Ta-blitz 1).
The most popular reasons for utilizing social media were found in all four nations where the poll was performed.
These are a) conversation with friends and/or relatives, b) news review, and c) video watching.
Russian is the preferred language for receiving information in Kazakh-country (53 percent) and Kyrgyzstan (54 percent), while Uzbek respondents (88 percent) prefer to receive information in Uzbek, and Tajik respondents (31 percent) prefer Tajik (31 percent) and Russian (32 percent) languages when receiving information.
According to the poll findings, WhatsApp messenger was the most popular communication app among respondents in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
In Uzbekistan, the Telegram program is used by most people, while in Tajikistan, among other messengers, it is the most popular.
It turned out to be a video-sharing scheniya Imo application, with technological functions comparable to Skype. Turkmenistan is also a big fan of Imo.
The Open Dialogue Foundation are leftovers from the Orange Revolution formed by SCL (Strategic Communication Labs). ODF gained most of their current experience as part of the team from SCL-IOTA Global’s 2014-16 Ukraine’s Maidan through Ukraine-Russia campaign, and SCL’s 2015-2018 US campaign creating Russian trolls, de-platforming people on social media, building the Trump Russia collusion campaign including the Steele Dossier, Russian collusion, and Russian hacking.
I will be checking them for involvement in the 2017 Trump inauguration through impeachments as well as foreign involvement in the 2021 Capitol Hill riots.
ODF social media coup and riot management tactical chops include;
- Learning color revolution methodology from SCL during Orange Revolution and making it mobile.
- Kicked off the 2014 Ukrainian coup using SCL social media methodologies through Mustafa Naayem and used the same social media technique to keep the Kazakhstan riot groups organized.
- 2016- current IO and Infowar operations against Donbass
- The ODF originated the #LetMyPeopleGo campaign that went viral on social media for Nadia Savechenko while she was in Russian Federation custody.
- Starting and managing the Hong Kong color revolution rioters and foreigners in 2014, 2019, 2021 using the same methodologies.
- Starting and managing the 2020 Belarus color revolution rioters and foreigners using the same methodologies
- Starting and managing the 2022 Kazakhstan coup riot(er) escalation and managing foreigners using the same methodologies. This is a Zoom discussion about this between themselves talking about managing the coup.
The reports they’ve generated provide a lot of insight for recent and future coup attempts in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan by highlighting the groundwork preparation reports that were done sometimes years ahead of time in these countries.
The groups involved with ODF in Kazakhstan at the street and brick-level are Human Rights Protection Fund “Qaharman”, Human Rights Movement “405”, Human Rights Movement “Veritas”, Human Rights Movement “Elimay”, Human Rights Movement “Article 14”, Human Rights Initiative “Femina Vertute”, Human Rights Initiative “BostandyQ Kz”, Human Rights Foundation “Open Dialogue”, Human Rights Protection Fund “Freedom Kazakhstan”, Italian Federation for Human Rights (FIDU), Public Foundation “We Against Torture”, and American Russian-speaking Association for Civil & Human Rights.
Martin Mycleilski ties the Open Dialogue Foundation to SCL IOTAGlobal spinoff DisinfoEU and the EU Parliament which was one of the underwriters for the TAAs done in Kazakhstan and countries under threat.
The Open Dialogue Foundation is located at-
Open Dialogue Foundation
Rond-point Schuman 6/5, 1040 Brussels
Hromadska Spilka «Фундація Відкритий Діалог»
PO box 116, 01024, Kyiv
The ODF admissions to all of the above will make tying IPs associated with the Whois listing below easier in all cases.
Pictured below, Antonio Stango is an Italian political scientist, an expert on human rights at the international level, a writer, and an editor. He has been leading several NGOs and international projects, monitoring conflict and crisis areas, consulting for the European Union Commission and Parliament and for the Italian Chamber of Deputies and Senate, organizing dozens of international conferences, enacting nonviolent initiatives in totalitarian States, and representing the Nonviolent Radical Party transnational and transparty (an NGO with consultative status at the ECOSOC) at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. On behalf of the International Helsinki Federation he took part in missions in Romania, Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan; on behalf of Hands Off Cain in four States in Central Asia and four in Western and Southern Africa; with various NGOs in four missions in Cuba and two in Iraqi Kurdistan; for the European Commission in Armenia, Russia, and Tajikistan.
He is currently a Professor of International Organizations and Human Rights at Rome Link Campus University. Link University gained notoriety in the case of George and Simona Papadopoulos as a Western Spy school. Its most notable asset was Joseph Misfud.
Stango was working with ODF to support the Kazakhstan regime change operation.
Link Campus University gained notoriety after its connections to international spy agencies were revealed in George Papadopoulos’s Deep State Target. Stango has been involved deeply in working with ODF to get sanctions on Kazakhstan as well as supporting their long-term effort of regime change. He has a lot of influence in Italy as well as the EU Parliament.
Ablyazov was the key all of this was built around. He is the single person that takes leadership outside the clan model leading the opposition to Nazarbayev with the possibility of pulling it off.
Second, he was the energy minister which is the sector he would gain outside support from if and only if worldwide hydrocarbon prices are going to remain high or IF the overthrow was successful on its own.
Nordstream II is the fulcrum all of this is balanced on. Without it, if Russia takes its gas east instead of west, still effectively shuttering Ukrainian transit.
All the older and/or more costly hydrocarbon rigs in the North Sea, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea will be very profitable again due to price increases.
Ukraine’s fracking fields will be profitable again. It has the 2nd biggest proven reserves in Europe even though it only has an export value. Ukrainians cannot afford Ukrainian hydrocarbon products and without Russian gas, the economy is tanking.
The Biden regime and EU can keep Putin’s Russia on the hotplate for years over high hydrocarbon product prices, inflation, a lagging economy, as they tear out the old infrastructure and replace it with as of now unviable “green” alternatives.
Why was Biden looking for expensive hydrocarbons in 2014 at a time when every company was starting to run away from it? This is a question worth exploring.
A coup in Kazakhstan could be the impetus for reshuffling energy contracts in Kazakhstan. This is probably what your UK & Turkey assessment means. You made it clear Erdogan is a friend to the Nazarbayev family.
The UK & Turkey connection begs the question if the London Energy Club and Bosphorus Energy Club are involved at least tacitly. They are already working the Caspian fields in Azerbaijan after building that expensive TANAP (Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline) and need to find volume for the pipeline.
Both of these groups use companies from the high end of the private Intel and security spectrum like Hakluyt and the possible fallout companies from SCL.
These groups can be viewed as passive stakeholders. If you succeed, they reward you, if you don’t, they aren’t involved. Their lack of protest to bring order from the beginning says a lot about their position regarding the coup. They were not worried about their investments.
Turkey is protected from high price spikes because of the Russian-Turkish Turkstream pipeline. Russia is a major supplier of cheap natural gas to Turkey.If successful, this coup had the potential for keeping Russia’s cheap gas out of Europe. This gives the Biden administration leverage to keep US production shuttered and hydrocarbon prices high justifying the Democrat’s promised green economic reboot in America.